Female migration : a way out of discrimination? by Ruyssen, Ilse & Salomone, Sara
Female migration: A way out of discrimination?
Ilse Ruyssena,b,∗, Sara Salomonea,b,c,∗∗
aSHERPPA, Ghent University
bIRES, Université Catholique de Louvain
cUNU-CRIS
Abstract
In light of the recent feminization of migration, we empirically explore to what extent
worldwide female migration can be explained by perceived gender discrimination. Mak-
ing use of unique individual level data, we track women’s intention and preparation to
migrate from 148 countries between 2009-2013 and disentangle how individual percep-
tions of gender discrimination can foster or impede female migration across countries.
We perform extensive robustness checks to mitigate concerns about potential threats to
identification posed by measurement error and unobservables. Our evidence indicates
that women who do not feel treated with respect and dignity have a higher incentive
to migrate abroad. The likelihood that these migration intentions are turned into ac-
tual preparations, however, depends on more traditional determinants such as household
income, network effects and family obligations. Furthermore, we also show that more
intense gender imbalances in economic and political opportunities prevent women from
actually moving abroad.
Keywords: Female migration, Gender discrimination, Migration intentions, Selection
model
1. Introduction
Gendered assessments of international migration processes are fairly recent both in the
economic literature (Cobb-Clark, 1993; Cortes, 2015; Docquier et al., 2012; Kofman,
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2000; Morrison et al. 2007; Zlotnik, 1990,1995) and comprehensive statistical datasets
(Artuç et al., 2015; Docquier et al., 2009; Dumont et al., 2007). They are nonetheless
essential for understanding female international migration (United Nations, 2004) and its
implications for economic development.1 Our paper contributes to this strand of literature
by empirically analyzing the role of perceived gender discrimination on female migration
intentions and subsequent migration behavior using original individual level data compiled
by the Gallup World Polls (GWP henceforth).
It is often put forward that female migration has now caught up to that of men, but the so-
called ‘feminization of migration’ is not a new phenomenon (Jolly et al., 2005).2 Women
already made up almost half of the migrant stock several decades ago and their numbers
have been steadily growing, both in absolute terms and relative to the global migrant stock
(Zlotnik, 2003). Without taking into consideration short-term and seasonal movements,
women represent more than 48 percent of the 244 million international migrants in the
world (United Nations, 2015). They outnumber men in developed countries with 51.5
percent while in developing countries they make up 45.6 percent of the total immigrant
stock. Similar numbers apply for OECD and non-OECD countries (see Artuç et al., 2015).
More importantly, women are more and more moving as independent or single migrants
rather than as the wife, mother or daughter of male migrants (Oishi, 2002; Pedraza,
1Empirical analyses on the role of women related to economic outcomes can be found among oth-
ers in Duflo and Udry (2004) who demonstrate how rainfall shocks that lead to higher yields of crops
predominantly cultivated by women, shift expenditures towards food consumption; Sorensen (2004) who
highlights the importance of female migrants in remitting money back home; Perkins et al. (2013) who
stress the positive role of female presidents on managing fractionalized countries; Behrman et al. (2014)
who provide evidence on the role of women in human capital transmission to children; Gajvani and Zhang
(2014) who investigate the effects of women on the provision of public goods such as water; and finally
Doepke and Tertilt (2017) who show that targeting transfers to women may be beneficial or harmful
to growth. For a more comprehensive critical overview of the link between female empowerment and
economic development see Duflo (2012).
2To put it in the words of Babatunde Osotimehin, former executive director of the UN Popula-
tion Fund: “La migration porte un visage humain, et c’est celui d’une femme.” In a 2013 article
in Le Monde, also a UN correspondent stated that “La féminisation de la migration n’est plus une
simple tendance. Apparue au début des années 1990, elle est devenue une réalité croissante et in-
contournable” (see http://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2013/05/08/le-nouveau-visage-feminin-de-
la-migration_3173506_3222.html).
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1991). These cross-border movements are to an increasing extent determined by economic
factors (Meierrieks and Renner, 2017; Sassen, 2003), with women being part of worker
flows, moving on their own to become the principal wage earners for their families (United
Nations, 2004). Yet they also continue to flee from conflict (Berhanu and White, 2000),
famine, persecution, epidemics, soil degradation (Gray, 2012), natural disasters (Gray
and Mueller, 2011) and other situations that affect their habitat, livelihood and security
(United Nations, 2004).3
Among the non-economic factors explaining female migration, gender discrimination has
recently proven to be of particular importance. Despite worldwide efforts to reduce gender
disparities, in general, women continue to lag behind in terms of basic freedoms and
opportunities, which might in turn have an impact on their migration behavior. The
expected direction of the effect is however ambiguous (Hugo, 2000). On the one hand,
restrictions on the role assigned to women may act as a push factor encouraging them to
leave their home country (Black et al., 2004). On the other hand, it might be exactly those
restrictions preventing them from leaving (Zachariah et al., 2001). Indeed, while hundreds
of millions of women worldwide would be willing to leave their homelands and start a new
life somewhere else, many of them may never actually set off because of economic and/or
personal circumstances (Esipova et al., 2011), among which gender imbalances might play
a role (see e.g. Chort, 2014).
Previous studies using macro data provide mixed evidence on the relationship between
gender discrimination and women’s migration behavior. Nejad (2013) and Nejad and
Young (2014) investigate the effect of institutionalized gender inequality, proxied by the
CIRI (Cingranelli-Richards) Human Rights Database (2014) women’s rights index, on the
high-skilled female migration rate. Their model predicts a non-linear impact of gender
3Focusing on the effects of non-economic determinants of both female and male migration, Loschmann
and Siegel (2013) explore the influence of vulnerability on migration intentions within the context of
Afghanistan and provide evidence that the most vulnerable households have the lowest likelihood to
migrate. Cai et al. (2014) consider the impact of life satisfaction on the willingness to migrate abroad
and find that at the individual level, subjective wellbeing appears even more important than objective
income. This finding is also confirmed by Dustmann and Okatenko (2014) who show that migration
intentions respond to individual wealth by alleviating budget constraints, especially in Sub-Saharan
Africa and Asia. Yet, contentment with local amenities like security and public services are found to be
even more important determinants shaping migration plans.
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inequality on the female brain drain ratio because of the adverse effect of gender inequal-
ity on the costs and benefits of migration, respectively. In the same vein, Baudassé and
Bazillier (2014) implement a gravity model to test whether labor market discrimination
should be considered either a push factor or a selection device for female migration. They
reject the former hypothesis and conclude that - all else held constant - gender discrimi-
nation has a positive influence on the female brain drain. Bang and Mitra (2011) analyze
the brain drain gap considering traditional controls as well as the quality of institutions
and proxies for gender equality such as women’s share of income, the fraction of women
in parliament, the male-female literacy rate gap, the male-female secondary enrollment
gap, the fertility rate and the female labor force participation rate. They find that a
significant part of the brain drain gap can be explained by the disequilibrium in access
to economic opportunities, captured by the fertility rate and differences in schooling and
literacy. Ferrant and Tuccio (2015), on the other hand, make use of the Social Institu-
tions and Gender Index (SIGI) developed by the OECD Development Centre, to provide
empirical evidence on the relationship between gender inequality in social institutions and
female South-South migration. They show that discriminatory social institutions in both
origin and destination countries form an important determinant of female South-South
migration.
Our study takes a new approach by making use of a subjective measure of gender discrim-
ination to examine both migration intentions and further migration behavior regardless of
destination. Unlike most studies disentangling the impact of gender imbalances on migra-
tion, we mostly rely on a micro level dataset and exploit the variation across individuals for
a large number of countries (see also Bertoli and Ruyssen, 2016; Dustmann and Okatenko,
2014; Manchin and Orazbayev, 2016). The newly available GWP provide a unique and
largely unexplored database on individual migration decisions as well as perceptions of
gender discrimination and respondents’ economic and demographic characteristics for 148
countries in the world between 2009 to 2013.
Our approach holds several advantages. First, by relying on individual perceptions besides
aggregate macro indicators of gender discrimination, we capture more than pure gendered
outcomes such as access to jobs, education, fertility and credit (see also Tuccio and Wahba,
2015) and measure women’s experience with gender discrimination. As put forward by
Kothari (2002), understanding why people migrate requires accounting for the complex
interaction of individual agency and macro structures. In other words, by focusing on
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whether women feel treated with respect and dignity in their country of residence, we can
identify the degree to which women can exercise agency depending on their sociocultural
environment (De Haas, 2009). As such, the GWP prove ideal to assess and advance the
existing macro evidence using an original micro-economic perspective.
Second, we are able to track a person’s intention to migrate as well as whether this in-
tention materializes. The decision to migrate has been shown to involve several steps,
not all of them observable and measurable (Paul, 2011). A few earlier studies already
recognized the distinction between migration intentions and actions (e.g. Cai et al., 2014;
Dustmann and Okatenko, 2014; Hatton and Williamson, 2002), but data limitations gen-
erally prohibited a separate analysis of the different stages. A few exceptions make use of
region or country-specific surveys to analyze both migration intentions and realizations
(e.g. Chort, 2014, for Mexico; or van Dalen and Henkens, 2008, for the Netherlands).
Chort (2014), for instance, uses micro data obtained from the two waves of the Mexican
Family Life Survey panel (2002 and 2005-06) to study discrepancies between Mexicans’
intention to migrate and their subsequent migration behavior. In fact, after having con-
trolled for various macro shocks likely to affect the migration decision, she finds that
women’s probability to carry out their migration plans is systematically lower than men’s
and concludes that women’s unrealized migration plans are due to gender specific costs
and constraints.
We believe that an analysis of what drives the intention to migrate in itself may sig-
nificantly contribute to our understanding of global migration dynamics. The Gallup
database, nonetheless, also allows us to gain insight into how these migration intentions
translate into actual plans and to explore to what extent perceived gender discrimination
alongside traditional personal characteristics can foster or impede women’s migration be-
havior. The empirical model that we bring to the data is a sample selection model in
which migration intentions and preparations are jointly estimated using a Heckman pro-
bit approach which controls for common unobserved shocks affecting all inhabitants in
the same way. Our estimation approach is exposed to the threats to identification posed
by measurement error regarding our variable of interest as well as unobserved factors that
influence both female migration behavior and perceptions of gender discrimination. We
follow four distinct and complementary approaches to rule out the concern that estimated
effect of perceived gender discrimination in determining migration behavior is driven by
measurement error or omitted variables.
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Our empirical evidence reveals that perceived gender discrimination forms a strong and
highly robust determinant of migration intentions, but it does not generally have an
additional impact on subsequent migration behavior. Overall we find that women who do
not feel treated with respect and dignity in their country have a stronger intention to move
out. Perceived gender discrimination hence positively affects the size of potential female
migration. Whether those intentions are subsequently turned into action is, however,
determined by other more traditional factors such as household income, network effects
or family obligations. Furthermore, we show that the likelihood that migration intentions
are materialized is lower for women facing a larger gender gap in labor market participation
disaggregated by level of education and rural versus urban residence.
From a development perspective, these results originally shed light on the role of in-
ternational migration as an additional channel through which gender discrimination can
influence origin economies which lag behind in terms of women’s economic, political, social
and cultural rights by pushing women abroad.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in
our empirical analysis obtained from the GWP as well as stylized facts on both migration
and gender discrimination variables. Section 3 provides the empirical framework used to
analyze the impact of perceived gender discrimination on migration behavior. Section 4
presents the empirical evidence from our benchmark model and it discusses threats to
identification. Section 5 provides the main conclusions.
2. Data and descriptives
All the individual data of interest were obtained from the GWP, which have been doc-
umenting personal and household characteristics of respondents all over the world since
2005 as well as their opinions on a wide variety of topics. A typical Gallup survey inter-
views about a 1,000 randomly selected individuals within each country.4 The data are
collected through telephone surveys in countries where the telephone coverage represents
at least 80 percent of the population. In Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in de-
veloping regions, including much of Latin America, the former Soviet Union countries,
4In some large countries such as China, India and Russia as well as in major cities or areas of special
interest, over-samples are collected resulting in larger total numbers of respondents.
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nearly all of Asia, the Middle East and Africa, on the other hand, an area frame design
is used for face-to-face interviewing. The sampling frame represents the entire civilian,
non-institutionalized population aged 15 and over covering the entire country including
rural areas.5
Our sample contains 153,296 females with valid information on all the variables of interest
used in the model, interviewed over the period 2009-2013 in 148 countries in the world.6
By 2013, the 148 countries represented about 97 percent of the worldwide population. In
what follows, we explain in detail how the variables of interest have been constructed.
2.1. Migration prospects
The literature on migration intentions is small but growing (Becerra, 2012; Carling, 2002;
Creighton, 2013; Drinkwater and Ingram, 2009; Dustmann and Okatenko, 2014; Jonsson,
2008; van Dalen et al., 2005a,b) and characterized by an ongoing discussion on whether
migration aspirations actually signal a person’s migration plans as opposed to pure wishful
thinking (Manchin et al., 2014; van Dalen and Henkens, 2008). The intentions to migrate
that we define in this paper are, however, stricter than mere migration considerations as
used by e.g. Creighton (2013). Whereas the latter considers whether the respondent has
thought about moving outside the locality or community where he or she lives in the fu-
ture, the GWP use a stronger formulation which directly asks for the likely response under
ideal conditions (Manchin et al., 2014). In fact, the GWP include two relevant questions
capturing individual migration prospects: (i) “Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would
you like to move permanently or temporarily to another country, or would you prefer to
continue living in this country?” and (ii) “Have you done any preparation for this move
(for example, applied for residency or visa, purchased a ticket, etc.)?”, which is asked only
5That is with the exception of areas where the safety of the interviewing staff is threatened, scarcely
populated islands in some countries, and areas that interviewers can reach only by foot, animal, or small
boat.
6While most actual migration data concentrate on the population aged 25 and over, our sample covers
also females aged 15-25. It could be argued that also younger women experience gender discrimination
which might influence their migration behavior. Young girls being forced into early marriage, for instance,
might have a higher willingness to leave their country but also a lower propensity to do so because they
are at more risk of being held back. Excluding this age group does, however, not alter our main findings.
The results are available upon request.
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to those who replied yes to question (i).7
Knowing what drives the intention to migrate allows to assess the subpopulation who
would consider moving abroad across origins, which in itself yields interesting insights
into future migration dynamics (see also Docquier et al., 2014; Dustmann and Okatenko,
2014). Nonetheless, to grasp to what extent migration intentions follow actual migration
dynamics, Figures 1 and 2 plot the change in the number of actual migrants between 2000
and 2010 as a share of the population in each country against the share of respondents
respectively intending or preparing to move out during our sample period.8 Overall cor-
relations between actual migration movements and migration intentions or preparations
amount to 0.19 and 0.27, respectively, both statistically significant at 1 percent. Similar
figures are obtained when the sample of respondents is restricted to natives only (i.e. 0.16
and 0.26, respectively). In line with expectations, we thus find a positive though fairly
small correlation between actual and potential migration. This is however not surprising:
7The questionnaire also has an intermediate question: “Are you planning to move permanently (tem-
porarily) to another country in the next 12 (24) months, or not?”, which we do not consider because -
contrary to its follow up question - a positive reply cannot separate vague ambitions from actual plans.
Furthermore, it continues with the question “To which country would you like to move?”. In this paper,
we do not consider the destination dimension. Our goal is not to explore where women end up because of
their own perception of gender discrimination but whether perceived gender discrimination can predict
their migration behavior conditional on intending to move. While we acknowledge that knowing what
determines the allocation of (female) emigrants across destinations and the role of (perceptions about)
gender imbalances in potential destination countries would be equally relevant from a development point
of view, addressing this issue would require a distinct empirical environment, such as the location choice
model developed by McFadden (1974) in which the population of interest would consist only of those
either intending or preparing to move abroad (see e.g. Bertoli and Ruyssen, 2016). Moreover, the GWP
offer information on women’s perception of gender discrimination only in their country of origin. They do
not track women’s assessment of the situation in the preferred destination country, so that only aggregate
measures could be used. Therefore, we chose to focus on the emigration decision and leave the question
of destination choice for future research.
8For the purpose of this comparison, we select only respondents aged 25 and over, compatible with
actual migration figures. Futherfore, whenever we construct country aggregates, we weigh each individual
observation by the relevant Gallup sample weight. These weights are designed to compensate for the
low coverage of certain groups (by gender, race, age, educational attainment and region) in the whole
population. Gallup assigns a weight to each respondent so that the demographic characteristics of the
total weighted sample of respondents match the latest estimates of the demographic characteristics of the
adult population available for the country (Gallup, 2012).
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in reality the translation of intended into actual migration is prevented by numerous per-
sonal circumstances such as health, finances or family obligations (Esipova et al., 2011)
as well as institutional hurdles related to migration regulations restricting the free move-
ment of people (Docquier et al., 2014). Regarding the discrepancy between migration
preparations and actual migration, it is important to stress that whereas the first might
encompass both legal and irregular migration plans, the latter is able to keep track only
of legal migration (Docquier et al., 2014; Friebel et al., 2015; Mbaye, 2014).
Figure 1: Aggregate actual migration and migration intentions (females)
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Notes: Authors’ calculations based on the Gallup World Polls and the United Nations Database. Share
of respondents intending to migrate denotes the share of female respondents claiming that they would be
willing to move abroad when an opportunity arises. Migrants as share of population denotes the change
in the number of female migrants between 2000 and 2010 by country of origin as a share of the female
population in each origin country. The surface of each circle is proportional to the size of the native
population residing in each country in 2000.
On average 16 percent of female respondents in our sample would be willing to migrate
when an opportunity arises. Around 4 percent of them already made preparations to do
so. These figures are slightly higher for men who appear to be both more willing to move
abroad and more likely to actually do so. The gap between those who intend to migrate
and those who are actively preparing to move is however larger for men, suggesting that
women’s reply to the question regarding migration intentions is more in line with actual
9
Figure 2: Aggregate actual migration and migration preparations (females)
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Notes: see Figure 1. Share of respondents preparing to migrate denotes the share of female respondents
stating that they have made preparations to move abroad.
prospects than that of men (see also Chort, 2014). Young, high skilled and employed
women have a higher chance of expressing an intention to move abroad, yet especially
young Muslim women and those with a per capita household income in the 20 percent
bottom percentile are preparing to do so in the near future. Females who are highly
educated, secular and employed, finally, have a higher chance to turn their migration
intentions into action.
Figures 3 and 4 respectively depict the shares of female respondents willing to move
abroad and those who prepare to do so in the near future. Aggregate migration intentions
appear particularly low in North America, South Asia, Oceania, the Middle East and
Brazil. Higher shares are obtained in sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and other
Latin American countries. The share of respondents claiming that they have started
making preparations for their move abroad, on the other hand, appears especially large
in South East Asia, Oceania, some sub-Saharan African countries, Central Asia and a
number of Eastern European countries.
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Figure 3: Women’s aggregate migration intentions by country
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Gallup World Polls.
Figure 4: Women’s aggregate migration preparations by country
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Gallup World Polls.
2.2. Gender discrimination
The most comprehensive question on gender discrimination available in the GWP reads
“Do you believe that women in this country are treated with respect and dignity, or not?”,
which is available for all countries in the sample between 2009 and 2013. A negative reply
signals that a woman feels that females are discriminated (not treated with respect and
dignity) in the country where she lives (coded as 1 and 0 otherwise).
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Ruyssen and Salomone (in press) explore in detail what this measure of perceived gender
discrimination actually captures on the basis of statistical correlations with other individ-
ual indicators taken from the GWP as well as aggregate measures of gender discrimination
frequently used in the literature. The two most relevant individual level indicators read
“In this country, are men and women treated fairly at work, or not?” and “In your opinion,
is domestic violence a serious problem for your country or not?”, both available only for a
subset of countries in our sample. In line with expectations, perceived gender discrimina-
tion appears negatively and significantly correlated with economic equality at work and
significantly but positively correlated with the severity of domestic violence.
Subsequently, the aggregated variable of interest is compared with the Cingranelli-Richards
Human Rights Dataset (2014) indicator on women’s economic (Wecon) rights, the OECD
Social Institutions and Gender Index, and the Country Policy and Institutional Assess-
ments equality index from the World Bank. Pairwise correlations between these macro
indicators and our aggregate measure of perceived gender discrimination indicate that
women are more likely to feel treated with respect and dignity when they are entitled
more economic rights, when they have higher access to credit, employment, and higher
education and when adolescent fertility and early marriage are less widespread. Overall,
it is concluded that the GWP measure of perceived gender discrimination refers to an
unfair difference in treatment mainly related to economic issues and family heritages.
These correlations confirm that the GWP individual indicator of perceived gender dis-
crimination measures similar aspects of gender imbalances as some of the macro indicators
used in the literature. Yet, the fact that they do not perfectly correspond seems to confirm
the idea that individual perceptions capture more than pure gendered outcomes. This
is not surprising given that the former are influenced by personal characteristics such as
the respondent’s education level, religion, residence location (rural/urban) or her social
environment (see e.g. Verloo, 2007). We believe that this individual perspective is exactly
the strength of our dataset which allows for a detailed analysis of the impact of gender
discrimination on the individual decision to migrate.
On average, 35 percent of female respondents state that women are not treated with re-
spect and dignity in their country. This figure is even higher for women who express an
intention to migrate, reaching 46 percent. In all but seven countries (Angola, Cambodia,
Ethiopia, Honduras, Indonesia, Singapore and Yemen), women experience gender discrim-
ination to be worse than men. The gap between female and male shares is on average 8
12
percent, ranging from -5 to over 20 percent. In countries with a large gap, some men have
either a lower awareness about the experiences of women or a different interpretation of
respect, perhaps influenced by machismo attitudes (Gallup, 2012). The lowest shares of
perceived gender discrimination are recorded for high skilled, non-religious females and
women with a household income per capita in the top 20 percentile. Also for those em-
ployed and Muslim, average shares tend to be relatively lower. Younger females (aged
26-35), Christian women and those living in urban areas on average have a higher chance
of identifying gender discrimination as an issue in their country.
Figure 5 illustrates the geographical distribution of the share of women identifying gender
discrimination as an issue in each country (averaged over the sample period). The degree
of gender discrimination measured in this way varies between 0.01 and 0.80. Many of the
world’s worst performers are situated in South America, sub-Saharan Africa and Russia
with Dominican Republic, Colombia and Honduras closing the country ranking. Women
indicate to be facing much lower discrimination in Europe, North America, Central Asia,
the Middle East and some countries in North Africa. The lowest level of gender inequality
can be found in the United Arab Emirates, Rwanda and Qatar.9
2.3. Migration and gender discrimination
Comparing the geographical distributions from the previous sections already offers some
preliminary evidence for the interconnection between gender discrimination and migra-
tion behavior. Darker colors in Figure 5 are associated with lighter colors in Figure 3,
confirming the expected negative relationship between perceived gender discrimination
and migration intentions. Comparing Figures 4 and 5, on the other hand, does not reveal
a clear pattern.
9In general, we find a similar ranking as the one based on the SIGI indicator (averaging over 2009 and
2012 values), with a few exceptions. Whereas the SIGI indicator suggests that women are facing relatively
high discrimination in social institutions in the Middle East and North Africa, gender discrimination
based on individual perceptions in these countries seems much lower. Comparing the lower and upper
tails of the distribution of the two indicators, we find no anomalies except for Peru which occupies
the sixth best place in the ranking according to SIGI and the fourth worst place based on individual
perceptions. Yet, as mentioned before, individual perceptions are not necessarily expected to be in line
with objective evaluations of the degree of gender discrimination because the former is influenced by
personal characteristics and the respondent’s social environment (see e.g. Verloo, 2007).
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Figure 5: Aggregate gender discrimination by country (females)
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Gallup World Polls.
This can also be seen from plotting aggregate migration intentions and preparations
against the aggregate degree of gender discrimination in a country perceived by its female
inhabitants. Figures 6 and 7 reveal that perceived gender discrimination is significantly
and positively correlated with migration intentions with a slope of 0.22, while the corre-
lation with the share of those who already started preparing their move is insignificant.
2.4. Other descriptives
Our empirical analysis also takes into account other personal characteristics which might
have an impact on migration behavior. They comprise the respondent’s current marital
status; educational level; employment status; age; the number of children under 15 years
of age currently living in the respondent’s household; a dummy variable for living in a
large city or a suburb of a large city; the log of household income per capita; the household
size, a dummy variable for having a household member, a friend or a relative abroad, and
finally an index measuring experiential wellbeing. For further details on these variables,
see Appendix A.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main variables of interest for respondents
respectively replying to the questions on migration intentions and preparation. A few
observations are worth mentioning. In our sample, 54 percent of the women is married,
14
Figure 6: Aggregate perceived gender discrimination and intentions to migrate (females)
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Notes: Authors’ calculations based on the Gallup World Polls. Aggregate gender discrimination
is calculated as the share of female respondents stating that women in their country are not
treated with respect and dignity. Aggregate migration intentions is measured as the share of
female respondents claiming that they intend to move abroad when an opportunity arises. The
surface of each circle is proportional to the size of the native population residing in each country
in 2000.
41 percent lives in an urban area, 41 percent is employed at the time of the interview and
respondents on average have 1.44 children living in the household. Intending migrants
are younger and slightly higher educated. Their number of children in the household
is slightly higher, i.e. 1.66 , but the most striking difference is related to the network
abroad. Whereas on average 33 percent of women intending to migrate state that they
have a family member or friend abroad, this figure rises significantly to 49 percent when
the sample is reduced to women actually preparing to do so. We may thus expect to find
a strong impact of social networks on both migration intentions and further migration
behavior (see also Bertoli and Ruyssen, 2016; Docquier et al., 2014).
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Figure 7: Aggregate perceived gender discrimination and preparations to migrate (females)
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Notes: see Figure 6. Aggregate migration preparations is measured as the share of female respon-
dents intending to migrate who claim that they have started making preparations for their move
(e.g. having applied for a residency permit or purchased flight tickets).
3. Empirical model
This section describes the empirical framework used to analyze the impact of gender
discrimination alongside traditional controls on women’s migration behavior. Following
Chort (2014), we assume that migration intentions are rational and hence correlated with
the same determinants typically found to explain the subsequent migration decision.10
Specifically, consider an individual i residing in country j, who has to decide whether or
not to migrate out of country j. Given the cross-country panel nature of our data, we can
write the utility that this individual would obtain from migrating out of country j as:
Uij = α +GDijβ +Xijγ + δj + ij (1)
10In general, migration intentions have been shown good predictors of future actual migration suggesting
that the factors driving a person’s actual migration decision also determine his or her willingness to
migrate (Creighton, 2013; Dustmann and Okatenko, 2014; van Dalen and Henkens, 2008).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (females)
Observations Mean St Dev Min Max
Overall sample
Migration intention 183353 0.195 0.396 0 1
Gender discrimination 183353 0.356 0.479 0 1
Age 183353 39.671 17.031 15 99
Married 183353 0.536 0.499 0 1
High skilled 183353 0.127 0.333 0 1
Number of children 183353 1.436 1.860 0 37
Urban 183353 0.412 0.492 0 1
Employed 183353 0.375 0.484 0 1
Household income pc (log) 183353 7.375 1.484 -5 15
Household size 183353 3.251 1.891 0 54
Network abroad 183353 0.339 0.473 0 1
Experiential wellbeing 183353 69.480 24.711 0 100
Intended migrants
Migration preparation 37458 0.039 0.195 0 1
Gender discrimination 37458 0.448 0.497 0 1
Age 37458 32.337 13.508 15 99
Married 37458 0.441 0.497 0 1
High skilled 37458 0.148 0.356 0 1
Number of children 37458 1.658 1.986 0 43
Urban 37458 0.449 0.497 0 1
Employed 37458 0.373 0.484 0 1
Household income pc (log) 37458 7.162 1.447 -5 13
Household size 37458 3.552 2.038 1 54
Network abroad 37458 0.490 0.500 0 1
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Gallup World Polls. The upper
panel displays descriptive statistics for all women in our sample while the
lower panel corresponds to those who have expressed an intention to move
abroad.
where GDij represents a dummy capturing whether or not individual i indicates that
women in country j are treated with respect and dignity. Xij denotes the set of per-
sonal and household characteristics traditionally used to explain the individual decision
to migrate. Specifically, we include age, marital status (married or not), education level
(obtained a college degree or not), number of children in the household, urbanization
(urban or rural), employment status, income (log of per capita household income in PPP
international dollars)11, household size and the presence of a network abroad (having a
household member, a friend or a relative abroad).12 The country fixed effects, δj, allow
11Other authors consider also the role played by perceived income (see e.g. Dustmann and Okatenko,
2014). As a robustness check, we also included satisfaction with the personal standard of living and
satisfaction with the household income, but this did not alter our main findings.
12For details on the data construction of the variables included in the empirical analysis, see Appendix
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to account for unobserved characteristics common to all inhabitants in the country.
The observed dependent variables Intentionij and Preparationij then take the value 1
if their corresponding utility exceeds 0, and 0 otherwise.13 Assuming that ij ∼ N(0, 1),
we can write the empirical specification in the form of a probit sample selection model
in which women first identify whether they would be willing to migrate abroad when
an opportunity arises, and subsequently - if they intend to move - whether they have
actually decided to do so, i.e. started making preparations for their move. The selection
and outcome equation take the form:
Intentionij = 1 (α1 +GDijβ1 + Zijγ1 + δ1,j + 1,ij > 0) (2)
Preparationij = 1 (α2 +GDijβ2 +Xijγ2 + δ2,j + 2,ij > 0) (3)
where 1(.) is the indicator function taking the value 1 if the statement in the brackets is
true and 0 otherwise. Preparationij is observed only if Intentionij = 1, i.e. the probabil-
ity to prepare for emigration is a conditional probability (conditional to having expressed
an intention to emigrate).In other words, the sample in equation (3) is not randomly
selected, such that ρ = Corr(1,ij; 2,ij) 6= 0. The model is estimated using a Heckman
probit approach with country fixed effects, which provides consistent, asymptotically effi-
cient estimates for all the parameters in binary choice models with sample selection (Van
de Ven and Van Praag, 1981; Wooldridge, 2010).14
In order to have a well identified model, we need an exclusion restriction in the selection
equation. If we were to consider migration intentions and preparations as determined by
the same set of explanatory variables, the model would be identified only by functional
form, in which case Heckman-type coefficients would have no structural interpretation
A.
13Note that the dependent variables are defined unilaterally, i.e. we do not consider the destination
dimension. Although it might be interesting to analyze whether gender discrimination differentials deter-
mine also women’s migration destination choice, this is beyond the scope of the present paper but forms
an interesting pathway for future research.
14Fixed effects probit models typically produce biased coefficients and standard errors due to the
incidental parameter problem. Consistent estimates may, however, be obtained from estimation with
country of origin dummies provided that the number of observations per origin country is sufficiently large.
This requirement is satisfied in our empirical analysis: the number of observations per origin country in
our sample on average amounts to 1256 for migration intentions and 244 for migration preparations.
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(Maddala, 1999). Therefore, we add an index of experiential wellbeing (EB ij) to the set of
explanatory variables in equation (2), i.e. Zij = {Xij,EB ij}. This index combines a set of
positive and negative feelings individuals experienced during the day prior to the interview
(i.e. whether or not the respondent experienced enjoyment and happiness, liked what she
did all day, felt respected, smiled and laughed a lot as well as whether she experienced
anger, depression, sadness, stress or worry). In contrast to evaluative wellbeing (i.e. the
way people remember their experiences after they are over), experienced wellbeing seeks
to bypass the effects of judgment and memory and captures feelings and emotions as
close to the subject’s immediate experience as possible (Gallup, 2012). We expect that
this experienced wellbeing the day before the survey might affect how people reply to the
question on migration intentions but it cannot have made them start preparing for their
move given the short time frame.
4. Estimation
Each specification includes country of origin fixed effects and is fitted using the joint
maximum-likelihood procedure Heckman probit, unless stated otherwise. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered across origins. In general, the model
always converges and the Wald test always rejects the hypothesis that all parameters are
jointly zero.
4.1. Benchmark specification
Table 2 presents Heckman probit estimates of the impact of gender discrimination and tra-
ditional controls on female migration intentions and preparations. The first two columns
report estimated coefficients for the model including only personal characteristics tradi-
tionally included as controls in the literature. In line with expectations, we find that
both migration intentions and preparations are higher for unmarried women who are high
skilled and live in urban areas. Furthermore, young women are more likely to intend to
move abroad but age does not particularly influence the chance that this intention ma-
terializes. Our evidence suggests that migration intentions are higher among women in
households with higher per capita income and that a higher per capita income also fosters
the realization of those migration intentions: women in wealthier households are both
more likely to intend to move abroad and more likely to have undertaken action to do so
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conditional upon having expressed an intention to move abroad. Also the network effect
plays a key role in both stages of the migration decision, suggesting that women having
friends or family abroad are more likely to intend to migrate and that having a network
abroad also facilitates doing so (see also Docquier et al., 2014; Bertoli and Ruyssen, 2016).
Migration intentions increase with the size of the household but are not explicitly affected
by the number of children in the household. Having more family members - and hence
family obligations - seems to act as an additional incentive for women to move abroad.
With correlation between the number of children living in the household and the total
household size standing at 0.37, the statistically insignificant impact of the number of
children might partly be explained by collinearity. Furthermore, as expected, women in-
dicate a higher intention to migrate when their experiential wellbeing the day before the
survey was lower. To test the validity of the exclusion restriction, we separately estimate
the selection and outcome equation (to which we add the experiential wellbeing index)
using a simple probit estimator with origin dummies. The results (reported in the first
column of Table A-1) confirm that the index has a significant impact only on female’s
migration intentions, and not on preparations. With a few exceptions, the impact of these
traditional controls is robust across different specifications. All of them are included in
the remaining tables but we do no longer report their estimated coefficients for brevity.
The third and fourth column of Table 2 present our benchmark results, introducing in-
dividual perceptions towards gender discrimination. Our estimates suggest that whereas
gender discrimination clearly acts as an important incentive to migrate, it does not addi-
tionally affect the subsequent decision to actually do so among those who intend to move
abroad.15 The average marginal effect of gender discrimination on women’s migration in-
tention is estimated at 6 percentage points: with gender discrimination changing from 0 to
1, the predictive margin (i.e. the conditional probability of women’s migration intention)
15As a robustness check, we also account for the respondent’s religious beliefs, which might be considered
another non-economic determinant of the migration decision. As indicated in the Pew Research Center’s
latest annual report on global restrictions on relgion, roughly a quarter of the world’s countries still
struggle with high levels of religious hostilities - which can range from religious discrimination to violence
to persecution. Religion might hence act as a push factor for people experiencing religious hositlities, or -
like with gender discrimination - it might act as an obstacle to actually do so when minorities’ rights are
restricted. Controlling for religious background does not affect our main results. The results are available
upon request.
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Table 2: Impact of gender discrimination and traditional controls on female migration
Traditional controls Benchmark model
Intention Prepration Intention Prepration
Gender discrimination 0.244∗∗∗∗ 0.045
(16.86) (1.00)
Age -0.021∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.021∗∗∗∗ -0.004
(-27.50) (-1.31) (-27.17) (-1.45)
Married -0.137∗∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗
(-9.38) (-1.96) (-9.16) (-2.05)
High skilled 0.138∗∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗∗
(7.36) (7.63) (7.47) (7.78)
Number of children 0.000 -0.006 0.000 -0.006
(0.03) (-0.67) (0.08) (-0.67)
Urban 0.175∗∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(11.61) (2.21) (11.33) (2.33)
Employed 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.007
(0.29) (0.18) (0.29) (0.20)
Household income pc (log) 0.018∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗∗
(2.27) (4.79) (2.18) (4.79)
Household size 0.016∗∗∗∗ 0.004 0.016∗∗∗∗ 0.004
(4.10) (0.44) (3.89) (0.48)
Network abroad 0.413∗∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗∗
(26.00) (13.17) (26.21) (13.79)
Experiential wellbeing -0.004∗∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗∗
(-14.54) (-13.29)
Log likelihood -82879.9 -82420.9
Observations 183353 183353
Notes: The model includes country of origin dummies (not reported). Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered across origins. t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
increases from 17.2 to 23.2 percent. Our evidence hence suggests that the proportion of
females intending to migrate is 6 percentage points higher for those who consider gender
discrimination to be an issue in their country compared to those who indicate not to
experience any gender imbalances.
Women’s preparation to migrate conditional upon intending to move abroad, on the
other hand, is neither enhanced nor constrained by gender discrimination, but rather
explained by different personal factors such as household income or having friends or rela-
tives abroad. Nevertheless, this does not mean that gender discrimination does not affect
migration preparations. To see this, let us consider the following numerical example. We
have that 165 out of 1,000 women in the GWP who do not feel discriminated express an
intention to migrate and only 39 (i.e. 23.6 percent) of them actually prepare to do so.
If these women suddenly start to experience gender discrimination in their country, their
21
conditional probability to intend to migrate would rise by 6 percentage points. Hence, all
else held constant, this would translate in an increase in the number of intended female
migrants from 165 to 225. Consequently, also the number of women preparing to move
would rise from 39 to 53 (i.e. 23.6 percent of 225). In other words, from a quantita-
tive point of view, a change in the number of women intending to migrate because of
gender discrimination also affects the number of women actually preparing to migrate
abroad. This is an important point as female emigration from gender-unequal countries
has been shown to spur development in both origin and destination countries (see Kenny
and O’Donnell, 2016).
4.2. Addressing potential threats to identification
Our estimation approach is exposed to threats to identification posed by measurement
error concerning our variable of interest as well as omitted variables, i.e. unobserved
factors that influence both perceptions of gender discrimination and migration behavior.
We follow four distinct and complementary approaches to address the concerns that our
evidence about the key role played by perceived gender discrimination in determining
female migration intentions stems from measurement error or unobservables. More pre-
cisely, we re-estimate the benchmark model (i) on suitably modified samples, (ii) applying
an instrumental variables approach, (iii) on matched samples constructed using the Ma-
halanobis Metric Matching method, and (iv) adding further country-level controls and
more disaggregated gendered variables.
4.2.1. Modified samples
First of all, endogeneity might arise as a result of measurement error in our explanatory
variable of interest. Section 2.2 already provides initial statistical support for the eligibility
of our measure of perceived gender discrimination. Yet, several issues remain.
First, we have to ensure that our indicator truly captures gender discrimination rather
than a general lack of civil and political rights which would affect men and women in
a similar way (see e.g. Meierrieks and Renner, 2017).16 As a first robustness check,
16Note that we do not argue that men are not concerned with gender discrimination issues (see also
Ferrant and Tuccio, 2015). At first sight, indeed it seems that granting more rights to women holds no
obvious advantages to men. Yet, men are the ones who put all the reforms regarding women’s rights in
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we therefore replicate our benchmark estimation using the whole sample, i.e. data for
both men and women, to which we add a dummy for women and subsequently also an
interaction term between this dummy and perceived gender discrimination.
The first column of Table 3 reveals that, after controlling for the traditional set of personal
characteristics, women generally have both lower intentions to migrate than men and a
lower propensity to realize their migration plans (see also Chort, 2014). The probabil-
ity that a woman intends (prepares) to migrate compared to a man is 6 (1) percentage
points lower. The second column of Table 3 then confirms that both women and men
are concerned with gender discrimination when considering to move abroad but the ef-
fect is stronger for women than for men. Specifically, gender discrimination raises the
conditional probability of intended migration by 6 percentage points for women and by
5 percentage points for men. Yet, for actual migration preparations, again the effect of
gender discrimination itself and the interaction term with gender remain insignificant.17
A second source of measurement error might stem from the fact that our sample includes
not only natives, but also previously arrived immigrants residing in the country. Some
of the foreign respondents might however be temporary migrants, who plan to return to
their country of origin, or transit migrants who plan to move to another country in the
(near) future. Former migrants might be more likely to migrate again and could hence
exhibit different migration behavior than natives. In order to test the sensitivity of our
the last centuries in place. Also today’s gender composition and agendas of international organisations
and lobbies (“promoting gender equality and empowering women” is one of the eight UN Millennium
Development Goals) suggest that efforts to improve females’ conditions are not only pursued by women
(see e.g. Farré, 2011; Scambor et al., 2013). Doepke and Tertilt (2009) attribute men’s concern with
gender equality to rational incentives rather than moral sentiments. Their argument is that, from a man’s
perspective, there is a trade-off between the rights of a husband’s own wife and the rights of other men’s
wives.
17In order to see whether the impact of gender discrimination on migration behavior depends also
on other personal characteristics, we experimented with additional interaction terms. The effect of
perceived gender discrimination does not seem to vary with a woman’s age, marital status, education
level, employment status or the degree of urbanization of her living environment. The only statistically
significant interaction term involves per capita household income, and this only for migration intentions.
Yet, the pairwise correlation between this interaction term and perceived gender discrimination stands at
0.97, significant at 1 percent, which explains why perceived gender discrimination is no longer significant
once this interaction term is included. The estimation results are reported in Tables A-2 and A-3.
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Table 3: Estimations on modified samples
Whole sample Interaction Natives Non-Muslim High skilled
Dependent: Migration intentions
Gender discrimination 0.227∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗
(16.23) (11.11) (16.72) (15.45) (10.32)
Female -0.220∗∗∗ -0.244∗∗∗
(-11.71) (-11.67)
Gen discr x Female 0.069∗∗∗
(3.84)
Dependent: Migration preparations
Gender discrimination 0.004 0.028 0.056 -0.005 -0.007
(0.16) (1.01) (1.21) (-0.07) (-0.05)
Female -0.107∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗
(-4.18) (-2.41)
Gen discr x Female -0.055
(-1.59)
Log likelihood -166688.8 -166667.7 -78498.6 -50616.8 -12120.9
Observations 341217 341217 176018 116077 23266
Notes: The first two columns report estimates obtained using the whole sample of respondents (i.e.
women and men), while those reported in the last three columns concern only female respondents.
Each model includes country of origin dummies and the same set of individual controls included
in the benchmark regression (not reported). Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered across origins. t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
results to the inclusion of previous migrants, we re-estimate our model excluding them
from the sample, hence keeping only respondents who were born in the country. Limiting
our sample to natives only does not alter our main findings (see column 3 in Table 3).
Perceived gender discrimination always appears as a strong and robust determinant of
intended migration but not of subsequent migration behavior.
Third, it could be argued that gender discrimination affects women’s freedom of speech.
Gender inequality may bias the responses provided during the Gallup interviews. If
women’s freedom of speech is more restricted than men’s because of cultural or religious
barriers, as in many Muslim countries18, individual replies to the Gallup question on
perceived gender discrimination could be biased. Re-estimating our benchmark model
limiting the sample to non-Muslim countries only again does not affect our results (see
18See the ‘Freedom of Expression and the Rights for Women’ report by the AHA Foundation at
www.theAHAfoundation.org.
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column 4 in Table 3).
Furthermore, the answer to the GWP question regarding gender discrimination might be
influenced by socio-cultural preferences. The cultural transmission of values and norms
within the family, for instance, can have important effects on the way women are treated in
their country (Escriche et al., 2004) as well as on social norms regarding gender equality.
Depending on socio-cultural preferences and traditions, some respondents might claim
that their country has reached a non-discriminatory gender balance whereas others living
in the same country might still perceive gender discrimination to be an issue (Belotti,
1980). We presume this resilience of beliefs to be lower for the highly educated. As such,
their perceptions of gender discrimination should be less dependent on their socioeconomic
environment. In order to test whether our empirical analysis suffers from this kind of
bias, we limit our sample to high skilled females only, i.e. those who completed at least
4 years of education beyond high school and/or received a 4-year college degree. Column
5 in Table 3 reports a similar effect of gender discrimination on migration intentions of
high skilled women compared to that obtained in the benchmark model and again an
insignificant effect on migration preparations. Furthermore, although not reported here,
it is interesting to see that the migratory behavior of high skilled women is negatively
affected by the number of children at the 1 percent significance level.
4.2.2. IV approach and matched samples
As discussed above, the estimated effect of perceived gender discrimination might be due
also to unobserved variables that are correlated both with our variable of interest and
with migration behavior. These might concern both unobserved individual as well as
country characteristics. In the previous sections, we already reported several robustness
checks controlling for individual omitted variables such as a respondent’s religious beliefs
as well as satisfaction with the personal standard of living or with the household income,
all of which left our main findings unaltered. To uncover the causal effect of perceived
gender discrimination on migration intentions and preparations, we apply an instrumental
variables (IV) approach. The latter can, however, be conducted only by treating equations
(2) and (3) as independent, thereby ignoring potential sample selection bias. As explicitly
stated by Wooldridge (2010), allowing for endogeneity in a binary choice model with
sample selection is difficult and an integrated approach that simultaneously tackles both
issues in such a model does not exist.
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Keeping this in mind, we separately estimate equations (2) and (3) using the special
regressor approach proposed by Lewbel (2000). This IV approach accounts for the binary
nature of both the dependent variable and gender discrimination, GDij, which is in this
case treated as endogenous (Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). In fact, special regressor
based choice probability estimates are consistent with probit models (unlike those based
on linear probability models); do not impose assumptions regarding the joint distribution
of the error terms k,ij and ′k,ij (unlike maximum likelihood estimators); and permit
general, unknown forms of heteroskedasticity in the model errors (Dong et al., 2012). The
special regressor estimator only requires that the model includes a particular regressor,
V , which (i) is exogenous (conditionally independent of the error terms), (ii) appears as
an additive term in the model, (iii) is continuously distributed with a large support, and
(iv) preferably has a thick-tailed distribution. The requirements on the instrument set are
then the same as those for the linear two-stage least squares estimator, i.e. instruments
should be independent of the error terms and of full rank.
Following Dong and Lewbel (2015) who developed a special regressor estimator to ana-
lyze US interstate migration, we re-estimate our benchmark model with age as the special
regressor, satisfying all requirements. Specifically, Vij is defined as the negative of age
minus its mean to ensure that it has a positive coefficient and a zero mean. As instru-
mental variable for perceived gender discrimination we use an index for gender marking
in the language spoken by the respondents in the GWP, inspired by the recent economic
literature on the relation between gender in language and gender biases in labor market,
political and managerial outcomes at both individual and country level (Gay et al., 2013,
2014, 2015).19 Specifically, we make use of the aggregate Gender Identity Index (GII)
constructed by Gay et al. (2014) which exploits information on all grammatical features
19The rationale for this instrument relates to both cognitive and cultural mechanisms according to
which gender marking in language may influence the formation of gender identities, the salience of deviant
behavior from gender roles and gender roles themselves. In linguistics, a gender system is a set of rules
for agreements that depend on nouns of different types (Gay et al., 2014). The latter can be based on
biological sex (female versus male), or based on other social constructs (such as the distinction between
human and animal, age, social status). There are languages in which gender is evident in almost every
phrase, and others where it is completely absent (Corbett, 2011). This grammatical gender is one of the
most stable features of a language grammar, dating back thousands of years (see e.g. Wichmann and
Holman, 2009)
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directly related to expressions of gender (i.e. four out of the 192 grammatical features
classified by Corbett, 2011). For more information on the construction of the index, see
Appendix A. To identify the language spoken by respondents in the GWP, we take the
language spoken during the interview, assuming that this is either the language commonly
used by the respondent or the one spoken at home.20
Table A-1 reports the first-stage probit estimation results. The F-test suggests that the
Gender Identity Index is a strong instrument of perceived gender discrimination. The
reported Wald test shows that, using the whole sample of women, the null hypothesis of
no exogeneity of the instrumental variable is rejected at the 1 percent confidence level
(first column), confirming the validity of the instrument.
The first and second columns of Table 4 show that re-estimating our model using this
IV approach confirms the positive significant effect of gender discrimination on females’
migration intentions as well as the lack of an additional impact on the realization of
these intentions.21 Marginal effects derived from the average index function proposed
by Dong et al. (2012) indicate that the predicted probability of intending to migrate is
2.9 percentage points greater for women who signal gender discrimination to be an issue
in their country. The estimated marginal effect of perceived gender discrimination for
migration preparations stands at -1.2 percentage points but remains insignificant.
As pointed out above, IV strategies can rule out endogeneity concerns, but they assume
that both samples in equations (2) and (3) are randomly collected from the underlying
population, which we know is not the case. To further mitigate concerns about potential
threats to identification while accounting also for sample selection, we can replicate a
randomized experiment by creating well-matched samples of female intending migrants
20This information is available for almost all respondents in the sample of interest with a few exceptions.
For those respondents for whom the information is missing, we chose the language of the country of
residence that is spoken by at least 80 percent of the national population (this is the case for Germany,
Hungary, Iran, Poland, Qatar, Slovenia, Somalia, United Kingdom, United States and Yemen). For
respondents residing in countries where no such language exists (i.e. in Benin, Luxembourg, Singapore
and South Africa) the information is set to missing.
21Note that we assumed that only the mean of age is related to the other covariates but also when we
allow higher moments of age to depend on the other covariates, we get similar results. The results are
also robust to using the kernel density estimator rather than the sorted data density estimator which we
used here. The results for these alternative estimation procedures are available upon request.
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Table 4: Instrumental variables approach and Heckman probit on matched samples - Female
migration
Special Regressor Heckman probit on matched sample
Intention Preparation Intention Preparation
Gender discrimination 112.712∗∗∗ -19.777 0.248∗∗∗ 0.121
(3.71) (-0.50) (13.86) (1.47)
Log likelihood -23535.5
Observations 143045 29700 52492
Notes: Each model includes country of origin dummies and individual controls (not reported).
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered across origins. t statistics in paren-
theses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
and non-migrants with similar covariate distributions.22 This allows to separate out the
causal effect of perceived gender discrimination from the effect of preexisting differences
between intending migrants (i.e. the “treated” group) and non-migrants (i.e. the “control”
group). To identify samples of female intending migrants and non-migrants that are
balanced in terms of covariates, we use the Mahalanobis Metric Matching technique (see
e.g. Imbens and Rubin, 2015). The resulting matched samples account for the panel
structure of our data and have an equal number of observations within each country.
Table A-5 describes the covariates distribution in both the original and matched samples.
For each covariate, we report the mean, standard deviation as well as the estimated coef-
ficient obtained from regressing each covariate on the dependent variable Intentionij and
country of origin dummies, followed by the p-value of the Wald test that this coefficient
is equal to zero. In the original sample, there are considerable disparities in the distribu-
tion of covariates for female intending migrants versus non-migrants: the differences in
personal and household characteristics are always statistically different from zero. The
matching technique, however, results in a matched sample exhibiting a balanced distri-
bution of covariates. After matching, the only variable along which female intending
22Close matching on the observed covariates has been shown to also mitigate bias stemming from
unobserved covariates that are correlated with the observed individual characteristics (Stuart, 2010). As
such, matching on observables implies at least some degree of matching on unobservables, especially when
the set of observed characteristics is fairly complete as in our case. Yet, there may still be unobserved
differences between the treated and control groups, but this is addressed by including additional individual
and country-level controls.
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migrants and non-migrants exhibit statistically different outcomes is the household size,
and this only at the 10 percent level.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 report Heckman probit estimates obtained using the matched
samples, and show that our main results are not driven by disparities in the distribution
of covariates: perceived gender discrimination provides an incentive for women to leave
their country but it does not additionally affect migration preparations. The estimated
marginal effect of perceived gender discrimination stands at 5.8 percentage points which
is almost identical to that obtained in our benchmark regression.
4.2.3. Inclusion of additional controls
A different way to deal with the threats to identification posed by unobservables is to in-
clude additional controls which might simultaneously determine migration behavior and
perceptions of gender discrimination in a country. It should be noted that time-invariant
unobserved country characteristics influencing both migration behavior and perceived
gender discrimination are captured by the country fixed effects. Yet, to further mitigate
concerns of joint determination, we re-estimate our benchmark model adding time-varying
country characteristics as additional controls, which allow us to control for the quality of
institutions, the average living standard and other factors that may affect overall living
conditions. Specifically, we include the Polity IV index to proxy for the level of democ-
racy and regime changes. Average living standards are approximated by the log of GDP
per capita in purchasing power parities, female life expectancy and HIV prevalence in
percent of the population.23 The data for these indicators were obtained from the World
Development Indicators (2015). Finally, we also consider the log of the occurrence of
natural disasters and intrastate conflict, taken respectively from the CRED EM-DAT
International Disaster Database and the UCDP Non-State Conflict Database 2.5 (2014).
The estimates are reported in Table A-4. In general, our results are robust to the in-
clusion of these additional country-specific time-varying controls: the positive significant
(insignificant) effect of gender discrimination on women’s intentions (preparations) to
move is preserved. Note that women have a lower intention to migrate from richer coun-
23We also collected data on female literacy and the yearly number of intentional homicides per 100,000
inhabitants but inclusion of these variables drastically reduced the sample size. Therefore, although their
inclusion did not affect our main results, we decided not to report the results (available upon request).
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tries with a higher female life expectancy. We also find that those who want to migrate
are more likely to effectively undertake action in countries experiencing conflict.
Finally, we also account for the intensity of gender discrimination. It could be argued
that gender discrimination exists in all countries (e.g. women earn lower average wages
than men worldwide, even after controlling for observed characteristics) and that our
individual measure of gender discrimination might capture whether a woman feels dis-
criminated, but not the severity of gender discrimination. It is important to note that
time-invariant differences in the intensity of gender discrimination across countries are
controlled for through the country fixed effects. Nonetheless, to explicitly account for
both dimensions we can add to the benchmark model a time-varying measure of the in-
tensity of discrimination as well as its interaction with individual perceptions of gender
discrimination.
In particular, we consider two distinct objective measures of the intensity of gender dis-
crimination in a country, namely the share of female seats in parliament and the gender
gap in labor market participation, both taken from the World Development Indicators.
The estimated coefficients for the share of female seats in parliament (reported in the
first two columns of Table 5) appear negatively significant for migration intentions, but
insignificant for migration preparations. Women thus have a lower intention to migrate
abroad when women’s representation in parliament is higher. The interaction terms re-
main always insignificant, suggesting that the effect of perceived gender discrimination
does not vary with the severity of gender inequalities. Importantly, the estimated effect of
individual perceptions of gender discrimination remains unaffected. Replacing the share
of female seats in parliament by the country-level gender gap in labor market participation
(reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 5) again preserves our main findings
but produces no additional significant results. This lack of significance may be due to the
fact that identification comes only from changes in the level of gender imbalances over
time, which are likely to be limited given the relatively short time frame of our analysis
(2009-2013).
More variation can come, however, from a more disaggregate measure of the extent of
gender discrimination which can be built using the GWP. Specifically, we compute the
gender gap in the labor market participation rates for people at working age (i.e. aged
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25-64) by education level and rural versus urban residence.24 Adding to our benchmark
specification both the previously significant share of female seats in parliament as well as
this more disaggregated gender gap in labor market participation rates along with their
interaction with individual perceptions of gender discrimination (reported in the last two
columns of Table 5) again does not alter our previous findings25: the estimated coefficient
of individual perceptions of gender discrimination remains positive and highly significant
for migration intentions and insignificant for migration preparations. Apart from the
recurring significant negative effect of women’s representation in parliament, neither of the
additional terms appear to significantly drive migration intentions. Interestingly, though,
we do find a robust negative impact of the gender gap in labor market participation on
migration preparations (significant at the 5 percent level). The results for the interaction
term between individual perceptions of gender discrimination and gender gaps in labor
market participation remains insignificant.
In sum, these findings suggest that perceived gender discrimination acts as a push factor
for migration, increasing women’s intentions to leave the country, but it does not influence
migration preparations further on. Women’s migration intentions are also found to be
stronger when gender inequalities are more severe. Yet, our evidence suggests that the
likelihood that these migration intentions are translated into concrete plans to migrate
is lower for women facing larger effective gender gaps (see also Loschmann and Siegel,
2013).
5. Conclusion
Despite notable progress in recent years, gender discrimination and violence against
women remains prevalent and persistent across the world leading to suboptimal outcomes
in terms of economic growth and development (De la Croix and Vander Donckt, 2010;
Doepke and Tertilt, 2009; Duflo, 2012; Esteve-Volart, 2008). This paper originally con-
tributes to existing gender studies by shedding light on the role of international migration
24The results remain unaltered when we compute this gender gap distinguishing only by education
level.
25The same results are obtained when we add to our benchmark specification only the more disaggre-
gated gender gap in labor market participation and its interaction, ignoring the share of female seats in
parliament.
31
Table 5: Controlling for the intensity of gender discrimination - Female migration
Fem seats parliament Labor market gap (WB) Labor market gap (GWP)
Int Prep Int Prep Int Prep
Gender discrimination 0.271∗∗∗ 0.057 0.270∗∗∗ 0.008 0.276∗∗∗ 0.029
(8.02) (0.88) (10.34) (0.13) (6.30) (0.33)
Female seats parliament (%) -0.020∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.020∗∗∗ 0.003
(-3.29) (1.02) (-3.28) (0.80)
Gen discr x Fem seats -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(-0.75) (-0.18) (-0.79) (-0.03)
Labor market gap (WB) -0.032 -0.055
(-0.96) (-1.60)
Gen discr x LM gap (WB) -0.001 0.002
(-1.16) (0.92)
Labor market gap (GWP) -0.120 -0.404∗∗∗
(-1.05) (-1.74)
Gen discr x LM gap (GWP) -0.013 0.144
(-0.16) (0.81)
Log likelihood -76854.4 -79400.6 -75976.9
Observations 173176 177051 171760
Notes: The model includes country of origin dummies and individual controls (not reported). Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered across origins. Labor market gap (WB) denotes
the country-specific gap between male and female labor market participation taken from the World
Bank Indicators; Labor market gap (GWP) denotes the gender gap in labor market participation by
origin, education level and rural/urban residence computed from the GWP. t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
as an additional channel through which gender discrimination can influence developing
countries of origin by pushing women abroad.
Mixed results from the recent strand of macro studies related to specific non-economic
determinants demonstrate that gender discrimination can act both as an incentive and/or
a constraint. Our analysis complements the literature by making use of micro data to
evaluate the impact of gender discrimination as perceived by the individual on worldwide
international migration behavior. Using unique individual data from the largely unex-
plored GWP, we exploit information for 148 countries between 2009 and 2013 on women’s
individual perceptions towards gender discrimination (related to feeling treated with re-
spect and dignity) as well as on their migration intentions and preparations to actually
do so. In this way, we are able to track women’s intention to migrate as well as the
realization of this intention and explore to what extent perceived gender discrimination
alongside traditional personal characteristics can foster or impede female migration.
We perform extensive robustness checks, thus mitigating concerns about potential threats
to identification posed by measurement error and unobservables. We find that perceived
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gender discrimination forms a strong and highly robust incentive to migrate, but it does
not seem to affect subsequent migration behavior. Our evidence suggests that other
more traditional determinants such as household income, network effects as well as family
obligations subsequently determine whether those intentions are turned into action. Fur-
thermore, women’s migration intentions are found to be stronger when gender inequalities
are more severe. Finally, we show that the likelihood that migration intentions material-
izes is lower for women facing more intense gender imbalances in economic and political
opportunities.
From an overall development perspective, our findings reveal a complex relationship be-
tween gender inequality and the size of potential female migration: gender discrimination
is shown to act both as an incentive and an obstacle for women to move abroad. As such,
further efforts to reduce gender inequalities are needed to improve the lives of women (as
evoked in the Millenium Development Goals) and to empower them to safely pursue their
migration intentions, which may in turn form a source of change and development.
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Appendix A. Data construction
The definition and source of the variables used in the regressions are the following:
Explanatory variables (Source: Gallup World Polls)
• Gender discrimination: dummy for experiencing gender equality. The dummy takes
the value 1 when the respondent replies positively to the Gallup question “Do you believe
that women in this country are treated with respect and dignity, or not?”, and 0 otherwise.
This question was asked in 148 countries.26
• Married: dummy for current marital status. The dummy takes the value 1 when the
respondent is currently married, and 0 when single, widowed, separated, divorced or do-
mestic partner.
• High skilled: dummy for being highly educated, which takes the value 1 when the re-
spondent completed at least 4 years of education beyond high school and/or received a
4-year college degree, and 0 otherwise.
• Children: number of children under 15 years of age currently living in the respondent’s
household.
• Urban: dummy for living in a large city or a suburb of a large city (as opposed to a rural
area, on a farm, a small town or village in which case the dummy takes the value 0).
• Employed: dummy for being employed full time for an employer, self-employed or em-
ployed part time by choice (as opposed to being employed part time but wanting full time,
unemployed or out of the workforce, in which case the dummy takes the value 0).
• Household Income per capita: log of household income per capita in PPP international
dollars.
• Household size: number of people currently living in the respondent’s household.
• Network abroad: dummy for having a household member, a friend or a relative abroad.
The dummy combines the replies to two questions of the Gallup database: (i) Have any
members of your household gone to live in a foreign country permanently or temporarily in
the past five years? (ii) Do you have relatives or friends who are living in another country
whom you can count on to help you when you need them, or not? It takes the value 1 if
the respondent answered “yes, still there” to the first question (hence, we ignore those who
have returned) or “yes” to the second one.
• Age: age of the respondent, varying between 25 and 99 because only those aged 25+ are
considered in our sample.
• Experiential wellbeing index: combines a set of positive and negative feelings individ-
uals experienced during the day prior to the interview, i.e. whether or not the respondent
experienced enjoyment and happiness, liked what she did all day, felt respected, smiled
and laughed a lot as well as whether she experienced anger, depression, sadness, stress or
worry.
26The country list is the same as the one for migration intentions, except that there are no data on
gender discrimination for Liberia and Switzerland.
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Instrumental variable
• Gender Identity Index GII ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}: corresponds to the sum of the following four
individual indices: (i) the Number of Genders Index (NGI) which equals 1 for languages
having two genders and 0 otherwise (no gender or more than two genders); (ii) the Sex
Based Index (SBI) which equals 1 for languages having a biological sex-based gender system
and 0 otherwise; (iii) the Gender Assignment Index (GAI) which equals 1 for languages
having both a semantic and a formal gender assignment system and 0 otherwise; and (iv)
the Gender Pronouns Index (GPI) which equals 1 for languages with a gender distinction in
third-person pronouns and in the first and/or the second person and 0 otherwise. Source:
Gay et al. (2014).
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Appendix B. Tables
Table A-1: Validity of exclusion restriction and instrument - Female migration
Probit Probit IV first stage
Dependent Migration Gender discrimination
Sample Intention Preparation Intention Preparation
Gender discrimination 0.244∗∗∗ 0.016
(16.86) (0.52)
Age -0.021∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(-27.17) (-1.49) (-15.94) (7.51)
Married -0.133∗∗∗ -0.053∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(-9.17) (-1.78) (-5.49) (-3.77)
High skilled 0.137∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.001
(7.47) (7.33) (1.03) (-0.17)
Number of children 0.000 -0.006 -0.001 0.000
(0.08) (-0.67) (-1.01) (0.07)
Urban 0.165∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(11.32) (2.07) (17.08) (8.05)
Employed 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.003
(0.29) (0.16) (0.56) (0.58)
Household income pc (log) 0.018∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ -0.003
(2.19) (4.72) (2.38) (-0.99)
Household size 0.016∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001
(3.89) (0.26) (2.87) (0.66)
Network abroad 0.413∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.004
(26.21) (15.68) (3.04) (-0.78)
Experiential wellbeing -0.004∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.003∗∗∗
(-13.28) (0.60) (-56.50)
Gender Identity Index 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(4.95) (2.35)
F-statistic 195.39 39.99
Prob > F (0.000) (0.000)
Wald Chi2(1) 25.16 0.95
Prob > Chi2 (0.000) (0.330)
Log likelihood -77386.8 -5034.3
Observations 183353 34839 150554 30413
Notes: Each model includes country of origin dummies (not reported). Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered across origins. Wald Chi2(1) and Prob >
Chi2 correspond to the Wald test of exogeneity of the the Gender Identity Index, i.e. the
instrumental variable. t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A-2: Interactions with personal characteristics - Female migration intentions
Age Married Highly skilled Urban Employed Income
Gender discrimination 0.198∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.054
(6.02) (13.92) (5.39) (13.71) (13.81) (0.90)
Age -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(-24.52) (-27.19) (-27.16) (-27.18) (-27.16) (-27.13)
Married -0.132∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗
(-9.16) (-8.50) (-9.14) (-9.15) (-9.13) (-9.14)
High skilled 0.137∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(7.50) (7.47) (5.48) (7.48) (7.47) (7.51)
Number of children 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06)
Urban 0.165∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(11.32) (11.33) (11.34) (8.99) (11.32) (11.33)
Employed 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.30) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.17) (0.30)
Household income pc (log) 0.017∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.007
(2.18) (2.19) (2.18) (2.19) (2.18) (0.78)
Household size 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(3.89) (3.89) (3.89) (3.89) (3.89) (3.93)
Network abroad 0.413∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗
(26.20) (26.21) (26.20) (26.20) (26.22) (26.21)
Experiential wellbeing -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(-13.28) (-13.29) (-13.30) (-13.29) (-13.29) (-13.27)
Gen discr x Age 0.001
(1.61)
Gen discr x Married -0.009
(-0.48)
Gen discr x Educ 0.040
(1.41)
Gen discr x Urban 0.019
(0.92)
Gen discr x Empl 0.003
(0.17)
Gen discr x HH inc pc 0.026∗∗∗
(3.32)
Log likelihood -82416.4 -82420.7 -82419.1 -82420.1 -82420.6 -82408.3
Observations 183353 183353 183353 183353 183353 183353
Notes: The model includes country of origin dummies (not reported). Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered across origins. t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A-3: Interactions with personal characteristics - Female migration preparations
Age Married Highly skilled Urban Employed Income
Gender discrimination 0.132∗∗ 0.053 0.071 0.058 0.062 -0.041
(2.10) (1.11) (0.76) (1.15) (1.23) (-0.28)
Age -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
(-0.75) (-1.44) (-1.46) (-1.45) (-1.44) (-1.48)
Married -0.066∗∗ -0.059 -0.068∗∗ -0.068∗∗ -0.068∗∗ -0.069∗∗
(-1.98) (-1.33) (-2.06) (-2.06) (-2.06) (-2.07)
High skilled 0.284∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗
(7.54) (7.75) (6.10) (7.77) (7.76) (7.81)
Number of children -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(-0.67) (-0.67) (-0.67) (-0.67) (-0.65) (-0.68)
Urban 0.078∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.082∗∗
(2.25) (2.32) (2.34) (2.34) (2.33) (2.36)
Employed 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.027 0.007
(0.17) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.57) (0.21)
Household income pc (log) 0.092∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(4.79) (4.80) (4.79) (4.78) (4.79) (3.83)
Household size 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.43) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.49)
Network abroad 0.706∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗
(13.16) (13.76) (13.89) (13.80) (13.75) (13.88)
Gen discr x Age -0.003
(-1.57)
Gen discr x Married -0.020
(-0.36)
Gen discr x Educ -0.020
(-0.27)
Gen discr x Urban -0.025
(-0.50)
Gen discr x Empl -0.044
(-0.67)
Gen discr x HH inc pc 0.012
(0.58)
Log likelihood -82416.4 -82420.7 -82419.1 -82420.1 -82420.6 -82408.3
Observations 183353 183353 183353 183353 183353 183353
Notes: The model includes country of origin dummies (not reported). Standard errors are ro-
bust to heteroskedasticity and clustered across origins. The positive significant effect of perceived
gender discrimination on migration preparations in the first column stems from the high collinear-
ity between perceived gender discrimination and its interaction with age, for which the pairwise
correlation stands at 88 percent. t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A-4: Controlling for country characteristics - Female migration
Institutions Living standard Disaster Conflict
Int Prep Int Prep Int Prep Int Prep
Gender discrimination 0.245∗∗∗ 0.052 0.227∗∗∗ 0.064 0.243∗∗∗ 0.055 0.242∗∗∗ 0.054
(16.87) (1.15) (12.26) (1.31) (16.42) (1.19) (16.29) (1.20)
Age -0.021∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.021∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(-26.27) (-1.66) (-26.06) (-2.33) (-26.28) (-1.64) (-26.34) (-1.69)
Married -0.136∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗
(-9.05) (-3.00) (-6.93) (-1.66) (-9.18) (-2.48) (-9.07) (-2.35)
High skilled 0.139∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
(7.09) (7.33) (6.19) (8.09) (7.04) (7.56) (7.27) (7.68)
Number of children 0.001 -0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.007 0.000 -0.008
(0.24) (-0.66) (-0.16) (0.05) (0.23) (-0.74) (0.09) (-0.80)
Urban 0.170∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗
(11.49) (2.41) (9.75) (2.92) (11.57) (2.44) (11.51) (2.52)
Employed 0.004 0.021 0.015 0.045 0.006 0.016 0.007 0.019
(0.30) (0.66) (0.81) (1.20) (0.41) (0.50) (0.46) (0.58)
Household income pc (log) 0.024∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(3.48) (4.93) (3.55) (4.31) (3.37) (4.95) (3.42) (4.96)
Household size 0.018∗∗∗ 0.006 0.016∗∗∗ 0.012 0.017∗∗∗ 0.006 0.016∗∗∗ 0.004
(4.83) (0.68) (3.61) (1.47) (4.07) (0.71) (3.84) (0.52)
Network abroad 0.418∗∗∗ 0.732∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗
(25.24) (14.28) (21.74) (14.66) (25.63) (14.45) (25.68) (14.15)
Experiential wellbeing -0.004∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(-13.24) (-9.82) (-12.88) (-12.94)
Polity IV -0.024 0.021
(-1.17) (0.73)
GDP per capita PPP (log) -2.212∗∗∗ 1.781
(-3.26) (1.46)
Female life expectancy -0.182∗∗∗ 0.022
(-3.08) (0.22)
HIV prevalence (%) -0.124 -0.716
(-0.47) (-1.62)
Natural disasters (log) 0.058 -0.041
(1.14) (-0.82)
Conflict occurrence (log) 0.135 0.209∗∗
(0.98) (2.31)
Log likelihood -76799.5 -53688.7 -78858.0 -79591.9
Observations 172213 112612 174246 177536
Notes: The model includes country of origin dummies (not reported). Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered across origins. t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table A-5: Balance checks for original versus matched samples of female intending migrants
and nonmigrants
Original sample Matched sample
Test H0: Diff=0 Test H0: Diff=0
Mean St Dev Coef P-val Mean St Dev Coef P-val
Age 39.671 17.031 -8.247 0.000 39.943 17.186 -0.032 0.781
Married 0.536 0.499 -0.100 0.000 0.532 0.499 0.000 0.913
High skilled 1.127 0.333 0.042 0.000 1.131 0.337 0.000 0.927
Number of children 1.436 1.860 0.022 0.019 1.378 1.793 0.021 0.142
Urban 0.412 0.492 0.077 0.000 0.423 0.494 0.000 0.969
Employed 0.375 0.484 0.012 0.000 0.375 0.484 0.000 1.000
Household income pc 7.375 1.484 0.062 0.000 7.414 1.476 -0.008 0.349
Household size 3.251 1.891 0.174 0.000 3.211 1.858 0.029 0.051
Network abroad 0.339 0.473 0.164 0.000 0.343 0.475 0.002 0.708
Notes: The total number of observations in the matched sample stands at 52492. Columns 3
and 7 report the estimated coefficient from a linear regression of the covariate on Intentionij and
country of origin dummies to account for the panel structure of the data. Columns 4 and 8 report
the p-value from the Wald test that the estimated coefficient is equal to zero.
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